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INTERDEPENDENCY THEORY-OLD SAUSAGE
IN A NEW CASING: A RESPONSE TO
PROFESSOR CZAPANSKIY
John DeWitt Gregory*
In her article, Interdependencies, Families, and Children,1
Professor Karen Czapanskiy begins with the observation that
the law "addresses the needs and miseries of children through a
variety of interventions designed to protect or advance a child's
best interests."2 After coming to the conclusion that the "best
interests" of the child standard is devoid of content, Czapanskiy
proposes her own "interdependency theory" as a solution.3
Czapanskiy argues that "a proposed legal intervention is
acceptable when it supports caregivers in maximizing their
ability to care for a child." Conversely, "[a] proposed legal
intervention is unacceptable when it impedes a caregiver's
ability to do what is best for a child."5 While Professor
Czapanskiy would see her theory applied to a variety of social
practices that affect children, including education, employment,
housing, taxation, transportation, daycare, and public benefits,6
the primary concern of her article is with child visitation by
persons not living in the household of the child. Accordingly, I
shall limit this response to that context.
As illustrations of her belief that the "[1]aw is often
oblivious to the needs of caregivers, despite the fact that society
* Sidney and Walter Siben Distinguished Professor of Family Law, Hofstra
University. I am grateful to Mitchell Treger for assistance in preparing this article.
1. Karen Czapanskiy, Interdependencies, Families, and Children, 39 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 957 (1999).
2. Id. at 957.
3. Id. at 957. See generally John DeWitt Gregory, Blood Ties: A Rationale for
Child Visitation by Legal Strangers, 55 WASH. & LEE LAW REV. 351, 385-88 (1998)
(discussing the extensive scholarly criticism of the best interest of the child
standard).
4. Czapanskiy, supra note 1, at 957.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 957.
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relies on caregivers to raise children,"7 Professor Czapanskiy
provides several examples of clients she represented in her
clinical legal practice. She is convinced that the law gave these
clients "a raw deal."' Representative is her story of an HIV+
father of two preschool children who were abandoned in infancy
by their HIV+ mother, an illegal drug user who sees the
children infrequently.9 The father rejects the clearly available
remedy of termination of the mother's rights that, we are told,
would permit him to adopt his children under Maryland law
and give him sole authority to decide on who would care for his
children after his death."° Rather, the father hopes that this
unfit mother who has deserted her infant children will change."
He seeks a legal remedy "allowing her the dignity of the title of
mother" while permitting him, as caretaker, to know that after
he dies some other trusted person will look after the children.
Professor Czapanskiy bemoans the fact that "the law... gives
him no intermediate path."W3
The actors in the second story include the mother of a
young child who divorced her husband after several beatings
and agreed to court ordered visitation. " The child, during
adolescence, decided to move in with the father and later
attacked and injured the mother during a visit to her home. 5
Despite reconciliation of the mother and child, their
relationship is difficult and the young man is "quite troubled." 6
Yet another story involves an out-of-wedlock child whose
paternity was established in a judicial support proceeding that
the state required in order for the mother to secure welfare
payments. Before her death, the child's mother designated
the stepfather to be the child's guardian. 8 The stepfather's
adoption of the child was delayed for more than a year because
of the law's requirement that either the mother obtain the
natural father's consent or show that it was impossible to find
7. Id. at 960.
8. Id. at 962.
9. Id. at 960.
10. Czapanskiy, supra note 1, at 960.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 961.
15. Id.
16. Czapanskiy, supra note 1, at 961.
17. Id..
18. Id.
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him.19
Finally, Professor Czapanskiy describes a case where a
woman adopted a child who became mentally ill.2" As a
teenager, the adopted child was in a relationship with an
abusive older man who was convicted of assaulting her, and
was raped by still another man, who was also convicted." She
became pregnant by one or the other of the men.22 With the
teenager's consent, the adoptive mother undertook to care for
the baby and subsequently petitioned for adoption, which by
law required service on both men, either of whom might have
been the father. 3  Ultimately, the adoptive mother/
grandmother withdrew the petition to avoid subjecting her
mentally ill teenage daughter to testifying again about the rape
and the assault.24
There is no denying that Professor Czapanskiy's clients in
these cases received "raw deals." It is not entirely clear,
however, that only the law is to blame for the different deals
they received. To conclude that the law is entirely to blame for
such treatment is to ignore the clients' bad choices,
extraordinarily bad luck, or both. While it may seem cruel to
say so, it is arguable, nevertheless, that considerable social
pathology and dysfunction, including domestic abuse,
criminality, and child abandonment and neglect, together with
the consequences of poverty and mental illness, contributed to
the unfortunate straits in which Professor Czapanskiy's clients
found themselves and to the distressful results in these cases.
Simply stated, Professor Czapanskiy's illustrative cases hardly
provide persuasive support for the substitution of
interdependency theory for traditional legal approaches.
Interdependency theory would give caregivers "maximum
autonomy, authority, and assistance,"25 in recognition of every
child's need for a caregiver and every caregiver's need for
support from institutions and other people." Accordingly, the
law respecting child visitation would not recognize legal
relationships or status. Rather, the central question is whether
19. Id.
20. Id. at 962.
21. Id.
22. Czapanskiy, supra note 1, at 962.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 959.
26. Id.
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the claimant for child visitation has "provid[ed] the caretaker-
child unit with support in a reliable and respectful way, and
whether that supportive relationship will continue" into the
future.27 Furthermore, a court should rescind an order of
visitation obtained by a person who fails to continue behaving
"in a supportive, reliable, and respectful manner."'
Professor Czapanskiy asserts that interdependency theory
would significantly reduce court intervention on behalf of
private parties into the lives and decisions of children and their
caregivers, and would permit intervention only to reward
supporting caregivers." To the contrary, the standard she
provides is just as likely to increase judicial interventions and
consequent opportunities for conflict as it is to reduce them. It
is not at all clear, I think, what facts will satisfy the standard of
supportive, reliable, and respectful behavior. If the courts
should adopt interdependency theory and apply Professor
Czapanskiy's standard, one may confidently predict thatjudicial decisions will be no more fathomable than they now are
under the prevailing standard of best interests of the child.
That is to say that judges, in determining what constitutes
supportive or reliable or respectful behavior, will continue "to
award custody [or visitation] to those litigants whose attributes
and values most resemble their own."3° Professor Czapanskiy's
virtually indeterminate standard does not allow judges the
opportunity to obtain reliable information from which they can
make an informed and logical choice. In this respect,
interdependency theory presents the same difficulty that
Professor David L. Chambers has identified with respect to best
interests. Professor Chambers has stated that "Ir]egardless of
what values judges apply, they do not obtain, and perhaps can
never routinely obtain, reliable information about the child and
the parents, and thus they cannot make sensible predictions or
choices.""
The standard of behavior under interdependency theory-
reliable, predictable, and supportive-provides to judges no less
27. Id. at 970.
28. Czapanskiy, supra note 1, at 970.
29. Id. at 964.
30. See Robert J. Levy, Rights and Responsibilities for Extended Family
Members?, 27 FAM. L.Q. 191, 197 (1991).
31. See David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody
Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 482 (1984).
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discretion than best interests of the child. Accordingly,
interdependency theory is subject to the same criticism to
which some commentators have subjected the best interests
test over the years:
Leaving judges with an ultimate standard but with no real
guidance on how to satisfy it puts them in a position of
having only two ways to do their job: either they follow
their own instincts or they rely on the expertise of others.
Following their own instincts is simply another way of
saying that they act in a vacuum, a philosophical vacuum,
in which their particular experience, upbringing, biases,
and perhaps, irrationalities led them to a conc[1]usion.
This form of decision-making is not only personal, bearing
no necessary relation to what another judge might decide
on the facts, but also utterly without any necessary
relation to what is best for the child in question.32
Simply stated, interdependency theory gives minimal guidance
to judges. Rather, it affords them the opportunity, which in all
probability they will be eager to accept, to exercise virtually
unlimited discretion in custody and visitation cases."
Interdependency theory would rely on function as a basis
for making visitation decisions and entirely reject status. 4 The
critical question is "whether the potential visitor has a history
of providing the caregiver-child unit with support in a reliable
and respectful way, and whether that supportive relationship
will continue into the future."35 As a result, entirely fit, non-
custodial natural parents of children could be denied visitation
and unrelated third parties could be granted visitation.36 In
this respect, interdependency theory rejects both conventional
wisdom and constitutional principle.
Current custody and visitation law reflects the societal
consensus that married parents generally make decisions that
are in the interests of their children and that they continue to
do so after divorce." This consensus is reflected in conventional
32. JAMES C. BLACK & DONALD J. CANTOR, CHILD CUSTODY 42(1990).
33. It is also arguable that some judges might apply Professor Czapanskiy's
uncertain standard too narrowly. Apart from intervention as a means of rewarding
a supporting caregiver, there are certainly instances when intervention is required
to save a child from significant harm, as under current law.
34. It is assumed, for purposes of this discussion, that Professor Czapanskiy
asserts that the theory would also apply in custody decisions.
35. Czapanskiy, supra note 1, at 970.
36. Id.
37. See PETER N. SWISHER ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND
19991 1041
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custody arrangements at divorce. Under what may be called
the "traditional arrangement," the court ordinarily will award
physical or residential custody to one of the parents. In
addition, the court will usually award reasonable rights of
visitation to the non-custodial parent." Parents in divorce
cases in which custody is not contested frequently agree on a
similar arrangement.
Recently, courts and legislatures in almost all states have
viewed joint custody as a means of giving divorced parents
shared and equal responsibility and decision making
authority.39 Both the traditional custody with liberal visitation
arrangement and joint custody reflect the same principle,
which is deeply imbedded in the law. A colloquium of
practicing and academic lawyers, mental health professionals
and judges have stated this long accepted and generally
recognized principle as follows:
Many observers, parents as well as mental health experts,
lawyers, and judges, believe that children are injured
substantially if denied interaction and relationship with
both parents. Whatever conclusions should be drawn from
the data, however, there is no doubt that judicial
decisions, and increasingly, statutory formulations make
assumptions which benefit non-custodial parents'
visitation interests. It is assumed, and not infrequently
stated explicitly, that it is in the best interest of a child to
have continuing contact and a continuing relationship
with the non-custodial parent. Indeed, the common
PROBLEMS 1091 (2d ed. 1998).
38. See JOHN DEWITT GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 106 (2d
ed. 1995).
39. Id. at 387. See SWISHER supra note 37 for a useful definition of joint
custody:
Many courts and commentators distinguish two aspects of joint
custody: legal custody and physical custody. Joint legal custody
generally means that parents have shared and equal authority to make
significant decisions involving a child's health, education, and welfare.
Joint physical custody, by contrast, refers to a residential arrangement
under which a child spends substantial periods of time living with, and
being cared for by, each parent. See Jana Singer & William B.
Reynolds, A Dissent on Joint Custody, 47 MD. L. REV. 497, 499 (1988).
Although some joint custody arrangements involve both joint physical
custody and joint legal custody, many other awards entail joint legal
custody only. Indeed, several empirical studies suggest that joint
custody to the mother is now the dominant custody arrangement in
several parts of the country.
SWISHER, supra note 37, at 1163.
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judicial warnings against denial of all visitation or
restriction of even supervised visitation indicate the social
value assigned to non-custodial parent-child
relationships.4 °
Noting that even a parent's psychiatric disorder is not a
sufficient basis for denying visitation between a parent and
child, the same authors observe that "[mlost mental health
professionals believe that children develop best in the context of
an ongoing relationship with both parents, and that some form
of contact between child and parent is preferable to no
contact."'"
Interdependency theory appears to ignore the conventional
wisdom that a continuing relationship with both parents is
important for the well being of children of divorce. Rather than
seeking to maintain these relationships, under interdependency
theory "it is critical to determine who the lead caregiver is." 2
For children who live with one parent, most often the mother, it
is the mother who is the lead caregiver for interdependency
41theory purposes.
The importance of identifying the lead caregiver becomes
apparent under interdependency theory, however, when there
is a change in composition of a two-parent family,4 which is, of
course, what occurs at divorce. For this purpose, Professor
Czapanskiy favors an "approximation rule," which "looks to the
prior caregiving practices of the adults and seeks to
approximate those practices in the future by allocating
caregiving responsibilities along the same lines, to the extent
that is possible."'5
Professor Czapanskiy provides several reasons for adopting
the so-called approximation rule and invariably favoring the
lead caregiver. This approach, she suggests, recognizes the
importance of maintaining security and stability in the child's
40. National Interdisciplinary Colloquium on Child Custody, LEGAL AND
MENTAL HEALTH PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD CUSTODY LAW: A DESKBOOK FOR
JUDGES 131 (1998) (citations omitted).
41. Id. at 185.
42. Czapanskiy, supra note 1, at 972-73.
43. Id. at 973.
44. Id.
45. Id. (citing A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.09 (Tentative Draft No. 3 1998); Elizabeth
S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. REV. 615,
630 (1992).
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life.46  Further, favoring the lead caregiver under the
approximation rule identifies caregiving as important and
deserving of reward.47 Also, it provides incentives to adults to
put children's needs first, "because their opportunities to spend
time and make decisions for the child after separation depend
on their caregiving practices before the separation."48 Finally,
favoring the lead caregiver will discourage caregivers from
behaving disrespectfully toward each other because such
conduct may lead to separation from, and less time with, and
diminished authority over, the child. 9
In sum, interdependency theory gives virtually
untrammeled authority over children of divorce or other family
breakups to the parent who functioned as the lead caregiver
while the marriage was intact. Professor Czapanskiy does not
describe in any detail the everyday childcare functions that will
qualify a claimant as lead caregiver. Presumably, these
functions are identical to those described as caregiving
functions in the American Law Institute Principles from which
the "approximation rule"" is derived. The first (and, I suggest,
critical and determinative) set of functions under this approach
include "feeding, bedtime and wake-up routines, care of the
child when sick or hurt, bathing, grooming, personal hygiene,
dressing, recreation and play, physical safety, transportation,
and other functions that meet the daily physical needs of the
child."5 1
Obviously, the provision of direct, day-to-day care is the
sine qua non for qualifying as lead caregiver and enjoying all
the benefits, privileges, and advantages that status affords in a
contested custody or visitation case. Just as obviously, in most
families, moms will qualify as lead caregivers, with full
authority over the children when the family breaks up, and
dads will not. Professor Czapanskiy acknowledges that
"[s]ometimes parents or other adults who share a home with a
child allocate their child-rearing roles badly."52
Interdependency theory, as under current law, would permit
46. Czapanskiy, supra note 1, at 973.
47. Id. at 974.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 974-75.
50. See A.L.I., supra note 45, § 2.09.
51. Id. § 2.03(6)(a).
52. Czapanskiy, supra note 1, at 975.
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parents by agreement to allocate responsibility in a manner
that is not consistent with the approximation rule. But in the
absence of parental agreement, interdependency theory would
not permit a court to deviate from the approximation rule in
allocating authority to the lead caregiver."
It is appropriate and fair for fit parents to agree at the time
of divorce or separation on a mutually satisfactory arrangement
for the allocation of child caregiving responsibilities. To require
application of the approximation rule as the unvarying default
rule when the parents are not in agreement, however, may be
grossly unfair. In the first place, allocation of caregiving
responsibilities during marriage is not necessarily a matter of
choice. Responsibilities are influenced, if not controlled, not
only by preference, but also by a myriad of other factors,
including skills, abilities, temperament, employment
opportunities, and the like. Secondly, and most significantly,
the time and energy spent in providing necessary economic
support necessarily denies the lead economic provider, who is
likely to be the father, of the opportunity to engage in
caregiving. It follows, of course, that without such economic
support the lead caregiver, usually the mother, would be unable
to carry out the functions that give her this preferred status.54
Nevertheless, upon separation or divorce, a father who has
fulfilled all of his marital obligations and functioned in ways
that are consistent with the mutual expectations of the parties
is relegated to the secondary position of supporting caregiver.
The ways in which interdependency theory would address this
father's dilemma strike me as entirely unsatisfactory. First, a
court may permit him, in this lesser role, "to continue to spend
time with, and have some decision making authority for, the
children."55 There is no apparent standard for determining how
much time he may get to spend with his children or the extent
of his authority.
The second means of resolving his predicament is hardly
within the divorced or separated father's control. If he
"continues to behave consistently after the separation,"56 then
the children may decide as they grow older, and particularly
53. Id. at 975-76.
54. I am indebted to Ronald K Henry, Esq., for bringing this anomaly to my
attention.
55. Czapanskiy, supra note 1, at 976.
56. Id.
1999] 1045
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after they reach adolescence, to increase the time they spend
with him." The benefit that supposedly flows from all of this is
to stop courts from reinforcing "gendered practices" during
marriage and to inspire couples "to allocate child-rearing
responsibilities according to their talents rather than according
to their gender."58
As I have stated, couples do not engage in so-called
gendered child rearing practices simply because of a deliberate
choice to do so. Furthermore, the arguments presented in favor
of interdependency theory do not prove, nor do they even
suggest, that "gendered" allocations of responsibility during
marriage are in the least harmful for the children of those
marriages. Absent such harm, I see no compelling reason for
preventing divorce courts under any and all circumstances from
reinforcing a couple's child rearing practices during the
marriage, however "gendered" they may have been. Even less
justifiable is the implicitly threatening suggestion that couples
had better be careful not to engage in child rearing practices
during marriage that may be characterized as "gendered."
Otherwise, in the event of divorce, at least one of them will
surely pay the consequences.
Among the more troubling aspects of interdependency
theory is an insistence on diminishing the status and authority
of fit natural parents. As Professor Czapanskiy points out,
American law entitles legal or biological parents to exercise
authority with respect to their children.59 Like others before
her, however, she declines to afford any advantage or privilege
based on legal status or blood relationships in custody and
visitation disputes, but would substitute function as the critical
element." Giving paramount importance to function, I suggest,
is unlikely to produce results that differ significantly from those
57. Id.
58. Id. at 977.
59. Id. at 985.
60. See, e.g., Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie That Binds: The Constitutional Right
of Children to Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L.
REv. 358, 410-11 (1994) (arguing courts should grant visitation rights to
individuals who maintain parent-like relationships with other people's children);
Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to
Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families,
78 GEO. L.J. 459, 464 (1990) (arguing for "expanding the definition of parenthood to
include anyone who maintains a functional parental relationship with a child when
a legally recognized parent created that relationship with the intent that the
relationship be parental in nature.").
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that divorce courts presently reach when contending parents
make custody and visitation claims. In cases involving third
parties contending for custody or visitation over the objection of
natural parents, however, interdependency theory could have a
significant and deleterious impact on current law.
As Professor Czapanskiy acknowledges, legal parents
typically satisfy the requirements of interdependency theory,
which means that most visitation orders would remain the
same." What this also means is that courts will for the most
part continue to give preference to the mother over the father
as child custodian, as they have in recent years." Indeed, for
quite a long time this preference was explicitly accepted by
many courts in the form of the "tender years" doctrine, which
presumed that a child of tender years should be placed in the
custody of the mother.
Despite the view of some courts that the tender years
doctrine was simply a factual presumption based on the role
that mothers historically played,63 and its continued defense by
some legal commentators,64 the doctrine eventually came into
constitutional disrepute as a gender-based classification.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court of West Virginia in Garska v.
McCoy65 created the primary caretaker presumption, requiring
that custody of a child of tender years be awarded to the
primary caretaker parent, as long as he or she is a fit parent.66
In order to establish which parent is the primary caretaker, the
trial court:
shall determine which parent has taken primary
responsibility for, inter alia, the performance of the
following caring and nurturing duties of a parent: (1)
preparing and planning of meals; (2) bathing, grooming
and dressing; (3) purchasing, cleaning, and care of clothes;
(4) medical care, including nursing and trips to physicians;
(5) arranging for social interaction among peers after
school, i.e. transporting to friends' houses or, for example,
to girl or boy scout meetings; (6) arranging alternative
care, i.e. babysitting, day-care, etc; (7) putting child to bed
61. Czapanskiy, supra note 1, at 986.
62. See SWISHER, supra note 37, at 1101.
63. See, e.g., Hammac v. Hammac, 19 So.2d 392, 393-94 (Ala. 1944).
64. See, e.g., Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo and Child Custody,
1 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 133, 203-22 (1992).
65. 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981).
66. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363-64 (W. Va. 1981).
1999] 1047
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at night, attending to child in the middle of the night,
waking child in the morning; (8) disciplining, i.e. teaching
general manners and toilet training; (9) educating, i.e.
religious, cultural, social, etc; and, (10) teaching
elementary skills, i.e. reading, writing and arithmetic."
There could not be a clearer example of function rather
than status as the determinative factor. Moreover, although
the primary caretaker presumption may be gender-neutral on
its face, it may compel the same "gendered" results as the
tender years presumption. What is more, in the following sense
it presents the same kind of potential for unfairness to married
couples that have been discussed above in relation to
interdependency theory.
Presumably, the primary caretaker has made some
sacrifices, either in terms of career or leisure time, in
order to care for the child; in light of those sacrifices, that
same parent may "deserve" to continue in the primary
caretaking role, if she or he so chooses. On the other
hand, it may be that the secondary parent wanted to be
the primary caretaker, but sacrificed his or her
preferences in order to be the breadwinner for the family.
A rule that accomplishes fairness between some parents
may thus be unfair between others.68
While West Virginia is the only state that has judicially
adopted a presumption favoring the primary caretaker, many
states, if not most, consider primary caretaker as a factor.69
To some extent, even joint custody is rooted in the
recognition of function rather than status. As the Supreme
Court of Iowa observed, "[flor the otherwise non-custodial
parent, joint custody gives recognition for prior performance of
the parental duties and prevents the termination of gratifying
interpersonal relationships."7 With respect to natural or legal
parents who confront each other in visitation or custody
litigation, I do not question Professor Czapanskiy's conclusion
that interdependency theory does not pose a threat.
In other cases, however, interdependency theory not only
poses a threat to natural parents, but it would radically alter
67. Id. at 363.
68. IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAw 514 (2d ed. 1991).
69. See, e.g., Maxfield v. Maxfield, 452 N.W. 2d 219 (Minn. 1990); Wolf v. Wolf,
474 N.W.2d 257 (N.D. 1991).
70. In re Marriage of Burham, 283 N.W.2d 269, 273 (Iowa 1979).
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current law and reject long-standing and valued constitutional
principles. Professor Czapanskiy states:
Because it privileges function over status,
interdependency theory supports some results in
visitation disputes that differ from current law .... [Ilt
does not matter if the person seeking time with a child is a
parent. Any formerly co-resident adult may qualify, so
long as the person qualifies as a supporting caregiver. In
other words, post-separation contact with a child depends
on pre-separation behavior, not legal status. Parents and
71
non-parents who behave the same are treated the same.
She identifies those non-parents who may claim access to
children as non-marital partners: (1) same sex partners who
separate after having created a parent-child relationship
together; 2 (2) grandparents; (3) former lovers of a single parent,
in which category I assume includes former stepparents who
are separated or divorced from a child's natural or legal parent;
and (4) babysitters.71
I have examined in detail case law, statutes, and scholarly
commentary relating to child visitation by legal strangers in
several of those categories, namely, lesbian co-parents,
grandparents, stepparents, and foster parents, and I have74
concluded that parental primacy should prevail in such cases.
I have not found any case in which babysitters have sought
custody or visitation, but I am confident that I would not afford
them standing to petition, let alone have their claims
recognized before the court. Professor Czapanskiy, to the
contrary, would not rule out the possibility of a paid babysitter
qualifying as a lead or supporting caregiver, even though she
believes that such an event would be rare under
interdependency theory.75 This is because "few babysitters live
with their charges long enough for the relationship to ripen into
a caretaking or even supporting caretaker claim."6
71. Czapanskiy, supra note 1, at 987.
72. Id. at 988.
73. Id. at 989.
74. See Gregory, supra note 3.
75. Czapanskiy, supra note 1, at 992-93. It is interesting to note that the A.L.I.
Principles permits certain adults who have resided with the child and performed
caretaking functions "for reasons primarily other than financial compensation," to
qualify as de facto parents. See A.L.I., supra note 45, § 2.03(1)(b)(ii). Obviously,
the quoted language eliminates babysitters.
76. Czapanskiy, supra note 1, at 992.
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I am not aware of empirical support for this assertion. If it
is based on experience, suffice to say that mine has been
different from Professor Czapanskiy's. Permit me to engage
briefly in storytelling. During my childhood and adolescence,
one of my aunts was actually named Nannie, which is ironic
because she was employed as one. I only saw Aunt Nannie on
Thursdays, her regular day off, and sometimes on Sundays.
The rest of the time, she lived with her charges, who were my
contemporaries, and their parents. My clear recollection is that
she cooked, cleaned, fed, diapered early on, and performed any
number of functions that presumably would qualify her to
make at least a supporting caretaker claim. My point is that at
least in some Black communities, the circumstances that I have
described are far from rare.
In further support of the babysitter's claim to supporting
caregiver status, she may even be contributing to the financial
well-being of the child's household. It is certainly within the
realm of plausibility that Aunt Nannie's presumably underpaid
services, which enabled the doctor who employed her and his
spouse to pursue their professional and other interests,
contributed to the financial well being of the household.
But the far more serious problem with interdependency
theory's equating third parties with natural parents is its
rejection of the long tradition in American law of family
autonomy and its natural concomitant, parental authority. As
one commentator accurately has observed:
The traditional view of our society is that the care, control,
and custody of children resides first in their parents; in
fact "constitutional interpretation has consistently
recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their
own household to direct the rearing of their children is
basic in the structure of our society." This parental
interest in family relationships has been defined as a
liberty interest entitled to due process protection.77
More than three quarters of a century ago, in Meyer v.
Nebraska,8 the United States Supreme Court explicitly
recognized the right "to marry, establish a home and bring up
"children" as a "liberty" guaranteed by the Fourteenth
77. Ellen B. Wells, Unanswered Questions: Standing and Party Status of
Children in Custody and Visitation Proceedings, 13 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 95,
109(1995).
78. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
1050 [Vol. 39
FAMILY LAW SYMPOSIUM
Amendment.79 In Pierce v. Society of Sisters" the Court
reaffirmed this principle.81 Almost a half-century later, in
Wisconsin v. Yoder,82 the Court quoted Pierce approvingly,
characterizing that case as "perhaps the most significant
statement of the Court in this area.8 The Court stated:
[T]his case involves the fundamental interest of parents,
as contrasted with that of the State, to guide the religious
future and education of their children. The history and
culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of
parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their
children. This primary role of the parents in the
upbringing of their children is now established beyond
debate as an enduring American tradition.
8 4
In subsequent decisions, the Court has repeatedly endorsed
family autonomy principles.85 Even if the reservations that I
have expressed are unpersuasive or can be overcome,
interdependency theory cannot be acceptable until it can be
squared with the commands of the Constitution.
79. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
80. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
81. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
82. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
83. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982) (stating that
natural parent is entitled to due process .at state-initiated parental rights
termination proceeding); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816,
843-45 (1977) (outlining procedures required to remove foster children from foster
homes); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) (holding
that mandatory termination provisions for public school teachers violate due
process); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (holding that state statute
that allows removal of children from custody of unwed father upon death of mother
violates due process rights of father).
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